李玉琼,田晗,赵贝贝.三重螺旋视角下我国制造业关键共性技术协同创新的演化博弈仿真分析[J].,2020,(2):48-54
三重螺旋视角下我国制造业关键共性技术协同创新的演化博弈仿真分析
Evolvement Game Simulation Analysis of Key Common Technology Collaborative Innovation in Manufacturing Industry from the Perspective of Triple Spiral
投稿时间:2020-01-05  
DOI:
中文关键词:  三重螺旋  制造业关键共性技术  协同创新  演化博弈
English Keywords:triple helix  key common technologies in manufacturing industry  collaborative innovation  evolutionary game
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作者单位
李玉琼 南华大学 经济管理与法学学院,湖南 衡阳 421001 
田晗 南华大学 经济管理与法学学院,湖南 衡阳 421001 
赵贝贝 南华大学 经济管理与法学学院,湖南 衡阳 421001 
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中文摘要:
      文章基于三重螺旋理论视角,引入政府对制造业关键共性技术协同创新的激励及惩罚机制,构建制造业企业、学研机构和政府的演化博弈模型,探讨演化路径、稳定策略及影响因素,并用Matlab仿真模拟。研究发现:制造业企业和学研机构从协同创新中获得收益越大,协同所需投入成本越小,双方越趋于协同,额外收益和初始成本足以使双方协同,因此无需政府过多干预;反之,政府需积极反应,政府资金支持与惩罚力度越大,制造业企业、学研机构越趋于协同创新。
English Summary:
      Based on the perspective of triple helix theory, this paper introduces the incentive and punishment mechanism of government to collaborative innovation of key common technologies in manufacturing industry, constructs a three-way evolutionary game model of manufacturing enterprises, institutions of learning and research and government, and probes into the evolutionary path. The stability strategy and influencing factors are simulated by Matlab. Research finds:The higher the profit from collaborative innovation, the smaller the cost of investment. The more the two sides tend to cooperate, the more the additional benefits and initial costs are enough to make the two sides cooperate, without too much government intervention; On the contrary, the government needs to make a positive response, and the stronger the government financial support and punishment, manufacturing enterprises and research institutions are more inclined to choose collaborative innovation.
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