| 杨美琴,龚日朝*.保险公司与投保人的静态博弈分析[J].南华大学学报(自然科学版),2008,22(4):73~76.[YANG Mei-qin,GONG Ri-zhao*.Static Game Analysis Between the Insurance Company and the Insurer[J].Journal of University of South China(Science and Technology),2008,22(4):73~76.] |
| 保险公司与投保人的静态博弈分析 |
| Static Game Analysis Between the Insurance Company and the Insurer |
| 投稿时间：2008-09-19 |
| DOI： |
| 中文关键词: 静态博弈模型 混合战略 反应函数 |
| 英文关键词:Static game model mixed strategy reaction function |
| 基金项目:教育部人文社会科学规划课题（07JA790084）；湖南省科技计划重点资助项目（2008ZK2002）；湖南省教育厅优秀青年基金资助项目（06B34）；湖南科技大学研究生创新基金资助项目（S080131）. |
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| 中文摘要: |
| 保险公司和投保人之间具有明显的信息不对称,由保险市场信息不对称导致的保险欺诈行为已经成为保险人面临的主要经营风险之一.而博弈论是研究信息不对称问题的一种有效方法.本文通过建立完全信息静态博弈模型,结合实际对保险公司和投保人的复杂关系进行分析. |
| 英文摘要: |
| There is serious information asymmetry between the insurer and the insured.Frauds of insurance resulting from the informative asymmetry of the insurance market has become one of the main business risks that insurers face.Game theory is an effective method to study the problems of information asymmetry.In this paper,a static game model with complete information was established.Through the static game model,the complicated relations between the insurance company and the insurer were studied. |
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