戴剑勇,唐倩倩,张澳,龚尚卿<.政府补贴下考虑制造商过度自信的绿色供应链融资决策研究[J].,2025,(1):74-83
政府补贴下考虑制造商过度自信的绿色供应链融资决策研究
Research on Financing Decision of Green Supply Chain Considering Manufacturer’s Overconfidence Under Government Subsidies
投稿时间:2024-02-23  
DOI:
中文关键词:  过度自信  绿色供应链  绿色信贷  政府补贴  Stackelberg模型
English Keywords:overconfidence  green supply chain  green credit  government subsidies  Stackelberg model (
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作者单位
戴剑勇 南华大学 经济管理与法学学院,湖南 衡阳 421001 
唐倩倩 南华大学 经济管理与法学学院,湖南 衡阳 421001 
张澳 南华大学 经济管理与法学学院,湖南 衡阳 421001 
龚尚卿< 南华大学 经济管理与法学学院,湖南 衡阳 421001 
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中文摘要:
      在政府补贴下,针对资金受限的制造商与银行构成的绿色供应链,研究制造商过度自信时的绿色供应链的定价与融资选择。文章构建以银行为主导、过度自信制造商跟随的Stackelberg模型,探究政府绿色信贷与直接补贴制造商的供应链运营决策,分析过度自信对银行与制造商均衡决策的影响。研究发现:除市场需求和银行的利润以外,直接补贴模式下的最优决策和利润值均大于绿色信贷。两种模式下产品绿色度、市场需求及银行利润的差距随着过度自信水平的增加而增大,银行利率、销售价格及制造商利润的差距随着过度自信水平的增加而缩小。政府补贴总额较低时,绿色信贷机制下制造商利润高于直接补贴机制。当政府补贴总额大于一定阈值时,直接补贴机制优于绿色信贷机制。
English Summary:
      Under government subsidy, targeting the green supply chain formed by manufacturers with limited capital and banks, this paper studies the pricing and financing decision making of overconfident manufacturers in regards to the green supply chain. By creating a Stackelberg model dominated by banks and followed by overconfident manufacturers, this paper explores the supply chain operation decision under the government's green credit policy and direct subsidy to manufacturers. Futhermore, the influence of overconfidence on the equilibrium decision of banks and manufacturers is analyzed. Results demonstrate that, excluding market demand and bank profit, the optimal decision and profit value under government subsidy are greater than that of green credit. Under the two scenarios, the difference between the degree of product greenness, market demand and bank profit increases with the increase of overconfidence level regarding the manufactures, while the difference between bank interest rate, selling price and manufacturers’ profit decreases with the increase of overconfidence level. When the total amount of government subsidies is low, manufacturers’ profits under the green credit mechanism are higher than those under the direct subsidy mechanism. When the total amount of government subsidy is greater than a certain threshold, the direct subsidy mechanism is superior to the green credit mechanism.
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