|
| 审计机构非强制性变更会加剧财务舞弊吗？ ——基于“合谋效应”与治理机制的实证研究 |
| Does Non-Mandatory Auditor Change Exacerbate Financial Fraud? An Empirical Study Based on the "Collusion Effect" and Governance Mechanisms |
| 投稿时间：2024-12-30 修订日期：2025-04-20 |
| DOI： |
| 中文关键词: 审计机构变更 财务舞弊 非强制性变更 内部控制 |
| English Keywords:Audit Firm Switching Financial Reporting Fraud Non-Mandatory Switching Internal Controls |
| Fund Project: |
|
| 摘要点击次数: 16 |
| 全文下载次数: 0 |
| 中文摘要: |
| 财务舞弊治理关系到资本市场高质量发展。论文以A股上市公司为样本，实证检验审计机构非强制性变更对财务舞弊的影响及其作用机理。研究发现，非强制性变更与财务舞弊显著正相关，支持了“合谋效应”假说，即企业可能通过主动更换审计机构规避严格监督，进而增加舞弊风险。研究还发现了治理机制的有效性，外部监督和内部控制能显著削弱上述正向关系，管理层过度自信则会加剧合谋风险。异质性研究表明，非国有企业和小规模企业中，非强制性变更的舞弊诱发效应更突出。论文揭示了非强制性审计变更的潜在舞弊信号功能，为投资者识别风险提供了新视角，提出强化监督和完善治理的双路径方案，为监管机构优化审计市场监控提供依据。 |
| English Summary: |
| Effective financial fraud governance is crucial for high-quality capital market development. Using A-share listed companies as a sample, this study examines how voluntary auditor changes affect financial fraud. The results demonstrate a significant positive correlation, supporting the "collusion effect" hypothesis that firms may strategically switch auditors to evade scrutiny, thereby increasing fraud risk. While external oversight and internal controls effectively mitigate this relationship, managerial overconfidence exacerbates it. The fraud-inducing effect is particularly pronounced in non-SOEs and smaller firms. These findings highlight voluntary auditor changes as a potential fraud indicator, offering investors new risk assessment insights while suggesting enhanced supervision and governance reforms for regulatory improvement. |
| 查看/发表评论 下载PDF阅读器 |
|
| 关闭 |