| 陈甲华,王平平,倪素素.基于前景理论的核电厂作业行为监管演化博弈研究[J].,2023,(3):1-9 |
| 基于前景理论的核电厂作业行为监管演化博弈研究 |
| Evolutionary Game Research of Nuclear Power Plant Operation Behavior Supervision Based on Prospect Theory |
| 投稿时间：2022-11-15 |
| DOI： |
| 中文关键词: 前景理论 核电厂 操纵员 监管 演化博弈 |
| English Keywords:prospect theory nuclear power plant operator supervision evolutionary game ( |
| Fund Project: |
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| 中文摘要: |
| 为提高对核电厂作业行为安全监管的效果,减少运行事件的发生概率,文章考虑参与主体的风险偏好,基于前景理论构建核安全监管机构、操纵员和核电营运单位三方的作业行为监管演化博弈模型,并对影响因素进行模拟仿真。结果表明,监管机构和核电营运单位的风险敏感系数的减小,会使得三方博弈最终不能稳定在最优策略上,而操纵员的价值感知系数使得其策略演化速度减慢,但并不影响最终策略选择。 |
| English Summary: |
| In order to improve the effect of safety supervision on the operation behavior of nuclear power plants, reduce the probability of operating events, and consider the psychological role of the participants, a game model for the evolution of the operation behavior supervision of nuclear safety regulatory agency, operator and nuclear power operating unit is built based on the prospect theory, and the influencing factors are simulated. The results show that the reduction of the risk sensitivity coefficient of regulatory agency and nuclear power operating unit will make the tripartite game unable to stabilize on the optimal strategy; The value perception coefficient of operator slows down the evolution of their strategies, but does not affect the final strategy selection. |
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