| 傅春燕,程粟粟,易永锡.基于上下游重复博弈的流域环境保护机制研究[J].,2019,(4):75-80 |
| 基于上下游重复博弈的流域环境保护机制研究 |
| Study on Watershed Environmental Protection Mechanism Based on Repeated Game Between Upstream and Downstream |
| 投稿时间：2018-10-16 |
| DOI： |
| 中文关键词: 流域 环境保护 重复博弈 |
| English Keywords:river basin environmental protection repeated game |
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| 中文摘要: |
| 解决流域水环境污染问题,需要深入分析各利益相关方在水资源利用和保护方面的行为逻辑,以设计和实施合理的政策机制。通过对上下游政府关于水资源利用和保护收益和成本的考量,分别建立上级政府进行单一经济绩效考核、经济绩效和环境绩效双重考核的上下游间博弈模型,分析流域地方政府的最优化行为。结果表明:单一经济绩效考核下,一次性静态博弈和有限次重复博弈不能激励上游地区对流域进行保护,而无限次重复博弈有可能出现“保护,补偿”的上下游间合作结果；在双重考核机制下,一次性静态博弈、有限次和无限次重复博弈均可能出现“保护,不补偿”的“上策”均衡结果。 |
| English Summary: |
| To solve the problem of water environmental pollution in river basin, it is necessary to deeply analyze the behavior logic of all stakeholders in water resources utilization and protection, so as to design and implement reasonable policy mechanism. Based on the considerations of the government agents' benefits and costs about water resource utilization and protection, this paper establishes two kinds of game model between upstream and downstream under the assessment only on economic performance and the assessment on economic performance and environmental performance and analyzes the optimization behavior of local government agent. Results show that under the single assessment mechanism, one-time static games, and limited time repeated game can't motivate the upstream area to protect water environment, but when the game is infinitely repeated, there may be a result of “protection, compensation”; Under double assessment mechanism, the “dominated equilibrium” result of “protection, without compensation” may appear in the one-time static game, the limited and infinite repeated game. |
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