| 易永锡,程粟粟.排污税调节下厂商绿色技术创新投资动态控制策略研究[J].,2018,(6):89-95 |
| 排污税调节下厂商绿色技术创新投资动态控制策略研究 |
| Research on Dynamic Control Strategy of Green Technology Innovation Investment Under Regulation of Emission Tax |
| 投稿时间：2018-10-08 |
| DOI： |
| 中文关键词: 绿色技术创新 排污税 干中学 动态控制策略 |
| English Keywords:green technology innovation pollution tax learning by doing dynamic control strategy |
| Fund Project: |
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| 中文摘要: |
| 考虑政府对厂商污染物排放总量征收排污税以及厂商绿色技术创新中的“干中学”,在Dragone等的基础上构建了一个新的垄断厂商绿色技术创新投资动态控制模型。模型分析的结果表明:其一,并不是排污税率越高对厂商绿色创新的激励作用越强,而是存在一个税率的临界值,过了临界值随着排污税率的提高绿色技术创新反而减少。其二,垄断者最优与社会规划者最优下的稳态均衡均具有鞍点均衡性质。其三,存在一个最优的排污税率,该排污税率下垄断者最优的社会福利恰好等于社会规划者最优时的社会福利。 |
| English Summary: |
| Considering the government's imposition of pollutant emission tax on manufacturers and the green technology innovation of “learning by doing”, a new dynamic control model of investment in green technology innovation for monopoly manufacturers is constructed on the basis of Dragone et al. The results of the model analysis show that:Firstly, it is not that the higher the emission tax rate, the stronger the incentive effect on green innovation, but there is a critical value of tax rate, which decreases with the increase of emission tax rate; Secondly, the stable equilibrium under the monopolist's optimal and the social planner's optimal has the saddle point equilibrium property; Finally, there is an optimal emission tax rate, under which the monopolist's optimal social welfare is exactly equal to the social welfare when the social planner is optimal. |
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