| 代行,刘萌芽,曾长虹.不对称信息下风险企业家激励机制的探索[J].,2007,8(5):31-33 |
| 不对称信息下风险企业家激励机制的探索 |
| The Exploration on the Incentive Mechanism of Venture Entrepreneur Based on The Information Asymmetry Situation |
| 修订日期：2007-07-12 |
| DOI： |
| 中文关键词: 风险投资,信息不对称,道德风险 |
| English Keywords:venture capital,information asymmetry,moral hazard |
| Fund Project: |
| DAI Hang LIU Meng-ya ZENG Chang-hong |
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| 摘要点击次数: 765 |
| 全文下载次数: 2 |
| 中文摘要: |
| 风险投资的整个过程涉及到投资机构、风险投资家、风险企业家三个市场主体的利益关系,而风险企业家又是实现投资增值的关键人物。基于委托代理关系下的信息不对称现象,并由此产生的道德风险一直是风险投资行业高度关注的焦点。文章利用数学工具的推理方法深入浅出地阐述了风险企业家道德风险的影响,并构建了相关的激励与风险分担模型,以供业界参考。 |
| English Summary: |
| The whole course of venture capital involves the interests relation of the organization of investment,venture capitalists and venture entrepreneurs ,which are three main market bodies,of which,venture entrepreneurs are the key personage who ensures the investment is value-added.The information asymmetry based on the relation about principal-agent and the moral hazard resulting from this have been the focuses to which the venture capital profession has paid close attention all the time.This paper explains the influence of venture entrepreneur's moral hazard with the reasoning method of the mathematics tools,and aims to construct a relevant model of encouragement and allocation of venture and provide a reference for the venture profession. |
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